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This is a sociological study of the self in modern Greece. Based upon a 
pilot study of social and political attitudes in Greece today, the study 
probes the sources of the moral self and of the internalized cosmological 
and ontological principles in Greece today, the types of social action they 
encourage, and the perception of the self, of civil society, and the type 
of the state they shape. The preliminary findings suggest that the Greek 
civil society is shaped by a distinct ‘civil religion’ that constitutes the 
cultural background of Greek secular life. This civil religion is strongly 
influenced by the Orthodox theology and religious practices that have 
decisively affected the various crystallizations of the four networks of 
social power (political, ideological, economic, and military) that 
constitute the Greek society in its various institutional formations. 
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To explore the causes of the deep socio-economic crisis in Greece today, we 
need to examine the interaction of deep cultural historical structures with 
historical processes and contingencies in the framework of the social division of 
labor and the networks of social power (Alexander and Colomy, 1991). 
Adopting a phenomenological perspective we assume that the self is not prior 
to morality but, instead, that the self is “constituted in and through the taking 
of moral stances” (Calhoun, 1991); that these moral stances, or moral 
frameworks, are informed by and derive from ultimate values, of historically 
developed “constitutive goods” or “hypergoods” (Taylor, 1989) that they 
emerge out of, and they are embedded in cosmological and ontological 
principles (Eisenstadt, 1995); that these civilizational principles inform 
methodical-ethical ways of life through rationalization processes that can be 
analyzed using the Weberian types of rationality (Kalberg, 1980); and, last, that 
the constitutive elements of the cultural system can be extracted by 
quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, thus allowing us to 
reconstruct at least some of the symbolic patterns(Alexander and Smith, 1993) 
that reflect these hypergoods in social action and structure.  
The basic working hypothesis of the study is that, not unlike the American civil 
religion (Bellah, 1967; Marangudakis, 2010), Greek civil religion, that is, the 
secular political framework of sacred and profane, good and evil, and of the 
moral community and its boundaries are deeply affected by church religion, 
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that is by Orthodox theology and religious practices that have permeated 
political mentality, irrespective of ideological and party identification and have 
become the deep cultural substratum of Greek civil life. In this paper, and due 
to limited space, we will concentrate on some critical elements of the Orthodox 
religion that finds expression in civil religion in Greece today.        
2.  Eastern Orthodox Religion and Greek Religiosity 
In contrast to the Protestant and Catholic rationalization processes that were 
developed throughout their history, in the East the strong presence of 
indigenous mystical traditions, among other factors, produced “apophatic”1 
theology, the doctrine of “deification by Grace”, and later on during the 
fourteenth century, the final version of the doctrine of the in-reach divine 
“energies” (next to out-of-reach divine “essence”) that reinforced the belief in 
the constant presence of God in materiality and the ability of the mystic to be 
united by God – the latter being the theological basis of a widespread spiritual 
exercise of mystical union with God amongst monastic communities called 
“hesichasm” (Ησυχασμός). In a nutshell, the Eastern theology considered as 
the means to approach God neither rational contemplation nor organization of 
routine life under a supreme political authority, but the process of “emptying” 
(κένωσις) of the self from personal or social certainties making room to receive 
the divine “energies” (ενέργειες) and thus to achieve “deification” (θέωσις) by 
the Grace of God (Weber, 1978:558).  
Second, organizationally, no strict bureaucratic hierarchy exists in Orthodoxy; 
instead each bishop is fully in charge of his diocese exercising his authority in 
an ad hoc fashion, with local churches and monasteries enjoying a considerable 
                                                 
1 It asserts that God is beyond rational comprehension and thus He can be approached only by 
contemplation and mystical experience.  
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degree of administrative autonomy; bureaucracy and legalism are only 
minimally exercised. Bureaucratic centralization of the Western kind was not 
possible in part due to this apophatic theology that in effect allows for two 
equally autonomous sources of grace and thus of legitimation: the institutional 
grace of the bishopric church and the charismatic grace of the monastic monk.  
In such a framework of social structures, the Eastern self, always in Weberian 
terms, could be neither rational nor methodical, as both the institutional and 
the charismatic sources of the Orthodox cosmological and the ontological 
principles, and the hypergoods their produce, are either primarily 
heteronomous or/and outworldly oriented. On the one hand, the institutional 
sources underline the “piecemeal evaluation” of personal actions, “implicit 
faith”, and “ardent devotion to the Church and its rituals”;2 as these 
hypergoods could not cultivating a methodical self, and are fed by external 
sources of morality, they inhibit the development of a morally systematized 
life-method. The charismatic sources, on the other hand, underline a life of 
Godly “complacency” and “idleness”. The hypergood they produce is to grasp 
the unified meaning of the world by empting the self from all daily concerns 
and in-worldly activities. In this framework, the salvationist good is not a 
proactive quality of action (a conscious dispensation of the divine will) but an 
inner condition of contemplation. 
Furthermore, the selective affinity between social action and the hypergoods 
these two sources of Orthodox morality produce, or encourage, do not coincide 
but in fact produce a very peculiar combination (ibid. 190-191). The hypergood 
                                                 
2 The piecemeal evaluation of morality is shown in the importance the Eastern Church pays to 
biographies of saints as various standards of ethical behavior. Particular individuals should follow the 
example of particular saints according to the case or the issue. For a review of the irrational-mystical 
aspects of the Eastern Church see V. Makrides (2005), 179-210.       
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the institutional Church produces is best met in conditions of routine social life 
whereas it encourages the “humble acceptance of the given social 
organization”; in contrast, the hypergood the charismatic source of morality, 
that is, the mystical monk, produces, is best met in moments of social crisis 
whereas his unworldly mystical habitus turns to millenarian-revolutionary 
habitus. This habitus is irrational in that “it despises any rational arrangement” 
giving priority to the feeling of godly love: “In that case his revolutionary 
preaching to the world will be chiliastically irrational, scorning every thought of 
a rational order in the world. He will regard the absoluteness of his universal 
acosmistic feeling of love as completely adequate for himself, and indeed 
regard this feeling as the only one acceptable to his god as the foundation for a 
mystically renewed community among men, because this feeling alone derives 
from a divine source” (ibid. 550).  
This divine, undifferentiated and uncompromised love which is achieved by 
emptying the self from its social selfhood, defines the ontological premises of 
the Orthodox worldview and delineates the Christian community as well as its 
internal distribution of power, the legitimation of its social action, and the 
boundaries of social trust: “The core of the mystical concept of the oriental 
Christian church was a firm conviction that Christian brotherly love, when 
sufficiently strong and pure, must necessarily lead to unity in all things, even in 
dogmatic beliefs. In other words, men who sufficiently love each other, in the 
Johannine sense of mystical love, will also think alike and, because of the very 
irrationality of their common feeling, act in a solidary fashion which is pleasing 
to God. Because of this concept, the Eastern church could dispense with an 
infallibly rational authority in matters of doctrine” (ibid. 551, emphasis added).  
  5 
This is closely related to the Eastern theological belief that the individual does 
not constitute an “instrument” (as in the ascetic orientation of action) but a 
“vessel” of God. The difference between the two modes of social action is that 
while the “instrument” perspective assumes and acknowledges the social 
division of labor and thus the specified and differentiated individual, the 
“vessel” perspective recognizes the abstract individual who is inspired by the 
Grace of God. What matters in this perspective is not the mundane individual 
but the transcendental individual. Thus, social action is not a process by which 
the world becomes rational by rational action in the framework of the modern 
division of labor, but a process by which the feeling of mystical knowledge is 
activated by an undifferentiated community of the righteous: “The illumination 
consists essentially in a unique quality of feeling or, more concretely, in the felt 
emotional unity of knowledge and volitional mood which provides the mystic 
with decisive assurance of his religious state of grace” (ibid. 546).  In this 
framework of undifferentiated love and mystical union, social action is not a 
rational process of organized social interest striving for tangible objectives, but 
an explosion of emotions toward achieving a hypergood in an absolute way and 
in a single, even violent, stroke that chiliasm implies. Lack of specified 
economic or political rational ethics means lack of rational social action or 
activist ethics. In effect, the inbuilt tensions of the social division of labor are 
left meaningless, in a state of cultural disorientation. 
Next to the ontological premises of the Eastern Church stand the cosmological 
principles, i.e., the delineation of time, space, and the meaning of the material 
world. Central to the understanding of the cosmos is the concept of “functional 
time” which constitutes the crucial concept that dissociates the Eastern from 
both Protestant and Catholic theological cosmologies. “Functional time” fuses 
timeless God with the temporal material universe, humanity, and the self. As 
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God is pure actuality, i.e., there is no past and no future for Him, His presence 
in the life of the individual, according to the ontological process of “deification” 
(see above), fuses past, present and future time in a “now” that transcends the 
“heavy yokes of worldly time and space” (Popovitz, 2012) The use of present-
time in the incantation denotes not a dramatic philological exaggeration but 
the actual unfolding of the event in real present time. This is made possible by 
the fact that the divine time is a constant and perpetual “now”. Thus takes 
place the spiritual “extension” (επέκτασις) and “present-ation” 
(παροντοποίησις) of the event to allow each and every generation of the 
faithful to participate equally to the unfolding of the divine plan. 
The principle of the cosmological and the ontological premises of the Eastern 
church is that the community of the faithful can actually experience the eternal 
truths, the eternal hypergoods of the afterlife in present time and space by 
transcending, partially by its own effort, its own habitus. Even though there is a 
sharp dissimilarity between the material and the immaterial cosmos, the 
Eastern Church insists on the constant “communication” of the two domains by 
divine energies.  In practice, this imperative is experienced by the faithful 
through a distinct process of religious transmission that focuses on the 
construction of the religious services and the veneration of the icons.  
The Icons in Eastern devotion do not constitute “signs”, mere instruments of 
catechism or representations of past events or persons, as are in Western 
theology, but objects which are related ontologically to the spiritual beings 
their depict. Quite literally speaking, icons are windows which allow the 
beholder to see and sense a reality that lies beyond this world, the 
transcendental domain itself (Freedberg 1989: 45). These “windows” to the 
transcendental realm do not stand in passivity in front of the beholder. Instead 
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in the context of the Eastern theology they are alive, and so they are perceived 
by the faithful: they have rich “biographical dimensions” and “social life” that is 
enriched by the legend that surrounds their creation, discovery, and/or 
location and relocations, by the passage of time and their miracles. They 
constitute living objects that are contextualized in the life of the believers 
through “internal” and “external” narratives (Banks 2001, in Hanganu ibid.: 48) 
referring accordingly to “the story that the image communicates” and the 
“social context that produced the image and the social relations within which 
the image is embedded at any moment of viewing” (Hanganu quoting Banks 
2001, 50). Agency and personhood are deeply affected by such a relationship 
as the “source of being” lies neither completely inside the individual nor in its 
collectivist self; it does not cultivate the inner-self of a self-contained 
individual, as is the case of the Western model, as it does not cultivate the 
collective “distributed personhood”, as is the case in various non-Western 
cultures. Instead, it cultivates a bi-polar personhood that shifts between the 
immanent and the transcendental and so are his/hers internalized ethics and 
code-orientations. The inner conversation of the individual takes place vis-à-vis 
the icon rather than the inner-self, thus forming a self-reflection made of 
imagistic autobiographical impressions rather than an inner “valid canon” of 
methodical life. This process certainly develops specific code-orientations but 
not a specific substantive rationality; the process remains uncompleted. 
3. Religiosity and Civility in Greece 
This emotive mode of religiosity was transferred into the Greek secular public 
domain, becoming the mode of perceiving civility, not only by elective affinity, 
but as an intentional cultural strategy of forging a modern Greek political 
identity. This took place through the deliberate identification of the Orthodox 
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believer with the Greek citizen not only externally, but as a personal, deep, 
existential experience. The individual who experiences the Christian-Orthodox 
truth, by definition experiences the condition of citizenship. This is a crucial 
identification; it meant 
“[N]o clear distinction between the concepts and the relative perception of a 
human being, an individual, a citizen, a Greek, and a faithful, as there is no clear 
distinction between the rights of man, the individual, the citizen and the 
faithful. Thus, it becomes clear from this point of view, that the attribute of the 
faithful and of the indigenous person constitute the main and primary features 
of the Greek from which all rights proceed” (Paparizos, 2000: 97-98) 
This is much more than a manipulation of the Church by the State or of the 
State by the Church, whereas the state is consolidated by the ardent support of 
the Church, or that Church’s hegemony is guaranteed by State paternalism. It 
constitutes the definite infiltration of the public, secular, domain by religious 
imagism: Citizenship is not something which is realized through the 
involvement of the person in public affairs, through his/her involvement in 
horizontal voluntary organizations, through civil acts that turn abstract notions 
of morality material and visible, but through the experience of worship and 
acts of faith; citizenship becomes an emotive experience.  
The “nation” and the “Church” become identical: the nation becomes a sacred 
entity that is perceived in transcendental terms similar to the religious ones. 
The regime, its functions, its wars are not to be questioned bur revered in a 
fashion similar to the fundamental rituals and theology of the Church: faith, 
suffering, resurrection, redemption, salvation. These are not exceptional 
developments in the framework of the construction of modern states and state 
ideologies; they took place everywhere in Europe and beyond during the last 
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two centuries. Yet, in a country with no middle class, and no civil tradition, 
their effects were overwhelming. They absorbed and neutralized any notion of 
civility based on individual propensities and creativity.  
Karamouzis, in a brilliant article of reviewing the literature of the effects of the 
Eastern Church on Greek citizenship concludes that anything national by 
definition became sacred and inviolable and vice-versa: the good Christian is 
the virtuous citizen, but, crucially, we would add, not vise-versa. Religious 
behavior is an efficient verification of ethical civility: 
We should not forget that the religious subbed of the modern Greek society 
throughout the 19th century constituted a significant parameter in the 
identification of the Greek citizen; the result of this could have produced more 
permanent consequences in the consciousness of the modern Greek compared 
with a secular national-political identity free of religious overlays. In this way, a 
peculiar type of citizen was established, a citizen who ought to comprehend 
his/her political presence in the modern Greek society through a set of rules 
which were legitimized only through religious duties which defined the virtuous 
citizen”  (Karamouzis, 2009: 92-3)            
True as it is that the Church allied with the most traditional, reactionary in fact, 
parts of the political spectrum, and true as it also is that this alliance crumbled 
after 1981, the mode of being a citizen through the religious experience has not 
really being questioned, or even more important, has not being replaced by 
another hegemonic discourse. Indeed, there are individuals or social groups 
that experiencing citizenship through voluntarist action, but the basic argument 
of the religious spirit of emotive collectivism is still alive: the undifferentiated 
“people” who deep in their heart experience the communal spirit in public 
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ceremonies in acts of emotional heightens incarnate the essence of 
citizenship.3     
This analysis of Orthodox religion and religiosity suggests that the cultural 
substratum of Greek civil religion today should be strongly collectivist, emotive, 
imagistic, as well as suspicious of bureaucratic institutionalism, formalities, and 
methodical ‘rationality’ (in Weberian terms). Following Eisenstadt’s 
structuration scheme, this cultural substratum should have permeated and 
affected the social division of labor as ‘ground-rules’, that is, specific ways of 
dealing with the indeterminacies of the social division of labor. Thus, while the 
responses of the participants in the research would be different, they should all 
comply to the aforementioned principles of Greek civil religion. 
4. The Research  
How could the aforementioned political tendencies and cultural predispositions 
manifest themselves in an empirical study? We could hardly expect individual 
perceptions to correspond squarely with an analytic diagnosis that reduces a 
complex and turbulent situation to personal reflections and quantified 
preferences, especially so in the framework of an original pilot study with no 
previous equivalent to depend upon. Thus, the questionnaire was constructed 
as a probing device to inspect the significance of some of the theoretical 
arguments, cultural interpretations, and historical contingencies that we 
consider as important in making sense of the social condition in Greece. Equally 
probing was the nature of the questions that were asked in the interviews in an 
effort to identify patterns of reasoning amongst the interviewees.  
                                                 
3 The presence of this fusion of civility and religiosity made itself visible during the ID cards crisis in 
2000 when millions of Greeks demonstrated against the political decision to remove the recordation 
of the citizens’ religious affiliation from the ID cards. 
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Together, they constitute the methodology foundation for a more focused and 
more specific research which will be able to target significant issues that until 
now were virtually a terra incognita to sociological research. 
4.1 The Quantitative Findings 
THE SURVEY’S DESIGN 
The questionnaire, consisting of 60 closed type questions and statements, was 
filled in by a selected sample of the General Greek Population during the period 
Jannuary-April 2012. A number of 49 qualified postgraduate students were 
employed as enumerators. The questionnaires were completed during 
interviews of the enumerators with the selected sample.  
A quota sampling method was employed and a total of 857 persons were finally 
selected. The sample was distributed proportionately not only to the 
population of the regions, but to the gender and age of the population as well. 
The quota controls were derived from the Population Census of 2001. As the 
sampling units were spread in all the regions of Greece, the statistical 
population of the survey was the general population. Representativeness in the 
quota sampling is not ensured in the degree that the random sampling does, 
but the former is easier to organize. Additionally, random procedure needs 
exact and proper sampling frames which are not available in Greece. 
Furthermore, geographical procedure, as an alternative, was not possible to be 
financed in the frame of the present survey. Finally, quota controls reduce 
variability and thus the bias within the quota groups, in selecting individuals, is 
unlikely to be serious (Hoinville et al, 1983). The quality of the enumerators is a 
crucial factor for the success of the whole procedure. The success of the 
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statistical analysis that is presented in the next section verifies the absence of 
considerable bias in the sample. 
As a sample of 1000 questionnaires was decided during the survey’s design, a 
Non Response Rate of 14.3 % appeared a percentage which is quite low. 
Although the valid questionnaires were 857, non response varied among 
particular items  with some “sensitive” ones presenting lower responses. The 
income for instance presents a N.R.R of 16%. In general the data gathered are 
of quite good quality considering available resources. 
Females constitute 57 % of the total sample and Males 43 %. Mean age was 
33.64±0.896 years old and the median age is 31 years old. Median should be 
used to present the average age instead of mean, as the ‘age’ variable does not 
follow the normal distribution.   
The basic elements of the above information about survey’ statistics are 
summarized in the table 1. 
TABLE 1: Basic information about survey’s design 
Sampling Population General Population 
Sampling frame Population Census of 2001* 
Sampling method Quota sampling 
Valid sampling unites 857 
Non response rate 14.3 % 
Data Collection method Interview 
Gender Distribution % (males/females) 43/57 
Mean age 33.64±0.896 
Median age 31 
*  Just as quota controls 
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Following the field work a number of checks were applied to the questionnaires 
to improve their quality. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Factor and Clusters analysis are used as the main statistical methods. 
First a Factor Analysis was applied  on the variables of the Triandis’ test (Table 
2) which distinguishes amongst four types of social behavior: (a) horizontal 
individualism (HI) which stands for expressing individuality without a 
competitive attitude to others; (b) vertical individualism (VI) which corresponds 
to aggressive individualism and competitive stand towards to the others; (c) 
horizontal collectivism (HC) which stands for voluntary collaboration amongst 
people aware of their individuality; and (d) vertical collectivism (VC) which 
stands for a more traditional acceptance of group priority irrespective of 
personal preferences. The findings show that the more important behavioral 
patterns found amongst Greeks are the collectivist ones with Horizontal 
Collectivism coming first, followed by the more conservative, Vertical 
Collectivism. Individualism on the other hand is the least important in our 
sample, with Horizontal Individualism being the third most important 
behavioral pattern, while Vertical Individualism, the ‘cut-throat’ version of it, 
being the least important of all four. In order to ensure the indigenous 
correlations, the statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) was used, 
which indicates the data suitability, the existence of adequate endogenous 
correlations and the adequacy of the sample, ranging in 0.801. At the same 
time, Bartlett’s Test Sphericity=3236.618, df=105, p=0.00 verifying the 
possibility of variable correlation, by using factor analysis.  
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TABLE 2: Rotated Factor Matrixa on the variables of the Triantis Test 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
18_2. I rely on myself most of the time;  
I rarely rely on others  
,077 ,094 ,702 ,050 
18_3. I often do "my own thing" ,079 ,033 ,515 ,193 
18_4. My personal identity, 
independent of others, is very important 
to me 
,210 ,201 ,603 ,018 
18_5. It is important that I do my job 
better than others 
,126 ,239 ,442 ,461 
18_6. Winning is everything -,102 ,005 ,092 ,647 
18_7. Competition is the law of nature ,111 ,133 ,255 ,430 
18_8. When another person does better 
than I do, I get tense and aroused 
-,225 -,039 -,018 ,606 
18_9. If a coworker gets a prize, I would 
feel proud 
,603 ,158 ,183 -,073 
18_10. The well-being of my coworkers 
is important to me 
,632 ,099 ,078 -,034 
18_11. To me, pleasure is spending time 
with others 
,688 ,156 ,122 ,036 
18_12. I feel good when I cooperate 
with others 
,676 ,172 ,082 -,153 
18_13. Parents and children must stay 
together as much as possible 
,031 ,377 ,039 ,119 
18_14. It is my duty to take care of my 
family, even when I have to sacrifice 
what I want 
,226 ,802 ,161 -,043 
18_15. Family members should stick 
together, no matter what sacrifices are 
required 
,285 ,711 ,224 -,009 
18_16. It is important to me that I 
respect the decisions made by my 
groups 
,289 ,323 ,042 -,006 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Note: a.Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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The second test is original and was developed to test the Ramfos (2011) thesis, 
that is the presence (and thus of absence) of the ideal type of Western citizen 
(the open, reflective, and responsible self) vis-à-vis the “entrenched self” that 
crystallizes the moral self of the closed society, and assumingly of the Greek 
political/social attitudes (Table 3). In effect, the responses to this group of 
questions identify particular discourses concerning a series of civic and civil 
issues and for this reason we consider it as a group that tests civil 
consciousness. The results of the factor analysis (table 2) indicate that there are 
particular selective affinities amongst these items, suggesting five ideal-types 
of discourses that indicate particular moral hypergoods: the “phobic” (F1), the 
“righteous” (F2), the “populist” (F3), the “egoist” (F4), and the “leveling” (F5). 
TABLE 3: Rotated Factor Matrix on the variables of civil consciousness test 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
20_9. The foreigners are jealous and conspire 
against us   
,799 -,052 ,090 ,085 -,012 
20_16. The foreigners impose a threat to our 
national identity 
,788 ,083 ,137 -,052 ,010 
20_15. I believe in the miraculous intervention 
of God in the world 
,571 ,248 ,149 -,135 ,135 
20_4. The role of the politicians is to adhere to 
my demands 
,412 -,108 ,213 ,240 ,114 
20_8. At the end of the day I am responsible 
for what happens to me 
,091 ,646 -,214 ,096 -,033 
20_2. Physical violence by no means belongs 
to social life 
,002 ,599 -,003 -,217 ,090 
20_7. If I consider something to be right I 
support it irrespective of the consequences 
-,111 ,565 ,105 ,466 ,026 
20_6. I sense the world more with my feelings 
rather than my intellect 
,115 ,508 ,326 ,103 ,006 
20_14. When the people truly get the power, 
it would be a matter of time to solve the most 
important problems 
,164 ,112 ,682 ,151 ,154 
  16 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
20_13. I feel that my life is controlled by dark 
networks 
,204 -,074 ,645 -,041 -,109 
20_17. In general I trust my fellow citizens 
irrespective of how well I know them 
personally 
-,008 -,187 ,452 ,043 ,405 
20_10. The interest of the people is above 
institutions and laws 
,249 ,180 ,417 ,328 ,060 
20_1. I am ready to fight for what I believe is 
right, even by breaking the Law 
-,138 ,148 ,158 ,726 ,011 
20_5. Before my personal profit I do not 
consider the Law 
,352 -,326 -,068 ,636 -,007 
20_3. “Justice” is more important that 
“individual rights” 
,203 -,016 -,168 ,159 ,780 
20_12. Between individual freedoms and 
social equality, I prefer social equality 
-,031 ,169 ,237 -,135 ,647 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Note: a.Rotation converged in 12 iterations. 
 
The phobic discourse (F1) certainly is centered on the “foreigners” yet, 
believing in the miraculous intervention of God and the understanding of the 
political domain as a process of “demanding” unfolds a comprehensive 
cognitive model: It suggests an enclosed moral self fearful of external 
“intrusions” to its life-world, wrapped in traditional religiosity and a simplistic 
idea of politics as a demanding-serving process. The belief in the miraculous 
intervention of God is the most intriguing item as it suggests not only 
traditional non-reflective religiosity, but also a more basic cognitive 
predisposition toward the immanent world: the deus ex machina principle of 
solving perplexed issues in a “magic” way, a way that involves little personal 
effort. This is the moral stand of a traditional self, entrenched in kinship and 
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locality. Significantly enough, it is the discourse most likely to be structured by 
those who identify themselves with the far right (but not exclusively so).     
The righteous discourse (F2) is an intriguing and most interesting combination 
of items. In its core lies the responsible and pacifist person which we consider, 
theoretical speaking, to be the foundations of a proper civil persona. Yet, it 
incorporates two more items that could be described as ambivalent, to say the 
least: self-righteousness and emotiveness. This latter blend of internal 
conviction and of filtering moral judgment by emotions suggests a highly 
personal sense of justice. This discourse matches the principles of the bi-polar 
individual of the Orthodox theological principles who combines righteousness 
with an inner, emotional, sense of justice irrespective of the consequence.  
The populist discourse (F3) brings together the typical elements of populism 
and its moral principles. It is based on apocalyptic notions of good and evil, 
insecurity, and illegitimacy. This discourse is more secular and humanistic than 
the phobic one as it is neither xenophobic nor with supernatural associations, 
yet, we could consider it as an offshoot of the same moral discourse: it 
exemplifies the imagistic notion of the good and the just in equally entrenched 
ways. But while the phobic one is backward looking wishing for a routine life 
pattern, the populist one looks forward to a revolutionary “miraculous” and 
final resolution of the tensions of modern life. Interestingly enough, in this 
populist discourse we also find being included the item concerning “trust of 
fellow citizens” (20_17). But, taking into account the context, this is not the civil 
trust of fellow citizens; instead, it is an abstract trust of the “people” who are 
seen as a community of transcendental worth.           
The forth, egoist discourse (F4) is the more straightforward one. It exemplifies 
the identification of the moral good with the personal benefit irrespective of 
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the law. In this discourse moral hypergoods, personal gains, and illegal 
behavior are mixed to produce a highly unstable mixture of anomic action. It 
indicates that naked egoism is not acceptable even for the egoist. It must be 
connected with some moral good, thus the connection of personal gain with 
justice; but not without cost: it isolates the actor from other hypergoods. And it 
is the discourse more likely to be preferred by people who identify their 
political preferences as far right or far left.  
Last, the leveling discourse (F5). It appears as the most ideological (collectivism 
above individuality) but it is not even remotely connected to any other item 
that would add to the discourse a sense of purposeful moral intention. Isolated 
from other connotating items, the discourse projects a moral picture that 
resembles more a herding mentality rather than of a people in power: 
someone who is willing to give up his/her individual rights as long as he/she 
retains his/hers essential similarity to the next individual.    
The statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) was 0.722. At the same 
time, Bartlett’s Test Sphericity =1496.7, df=120, p=0.00 verifying the possibility 
of variable correlation, by using factor analysis .It is important to note, that the 
five Factors occurred show the total variance of 51 % and 49 % loss.  
In all, the statistical analysis suggests low levels of civil consciousness which is 
reflected in the absence of a cluster of variables that gathers together the 
values of an ideal-type western civility. Instead, the clusters on the Factor’s 
Analysis Scores, that resulted from the civil consciousness test, reflect two 
crucial matters of civil morality: First, a high percentage of respondents do not 
take account of the law when it comes to issues of justice; here, the personal 
‘feeling’ of justice clearly predominates. Second, ‘people’ is considered to be an 
entity above and beyond institutional arrangements of power, and of rule of 
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law. Both are clearly in line with the Orthodox perception of the hypergoods of 
Justice and Good and the ways that should be achieved. Indeed, the context is 
secular rather than religious, as Heavens has been replaced by secular 
hypergoods. Yet, the ways to achieve them clearly remains Orthodox Christian. 
4.2 The Qualitative Findings 
AIM AND METHOD 
The aim of the qualitative part of study was to identify regularities (and note 
irregularities) in the ways social actors in institutional posts as well as involved 
in social movements orient to the socio-political and economic challenges 
presented in Greece. These included key social and institutional macro-actors 
that shape and form the public agenda and are located in major syndicates of 
the public sector (ΓΣΕΕ, ΑΔΕΔΥ, ΟΛΜΕ, ΓΕΝΟΠ-ΔΕΗ, ΠΟΣΔΕΠ, ΤΡΑΙΝΟΣΕ), the 
private sector (federation of taxi owners, and federation of trucks), and the 
social movements that either emerged or came at the forefront during the last 
two years: ‘I Do Not Pay’ («Δεν Πληρώνω»), ‘The Indignated’ 
(«Αγανακτισμένοι»), ‘Open City’ («Ανοιχτή Πόλη»), ‘Potato Movement’ 
(«Κίνημα Πατάτας»). We interviewed key social actors identifying with the 
above organizations either as elected representatives of trade unions or who 
aligned themselves with particular social movements. The rationale was that, 
owing to the position of the social actors-representatives of trade unions, the 
ways in which they construct civic identity and the current situation in Greece 
pervade, influence but may also be ‘in tune’ with public understandings of 
them (Pavlou, 2001; Moscovici, 1984). Our central assumption is that cultural 
codes and moral arguments are located in discursive constructions which take 
their meaning from the context of their utterance (Edwards, 1997).  
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Similarly, due to the centrality of social movements in terms of action but also 
in terms of heated (public) debates and discussions around them, especially at 
the time of the research (March 2012-February 2013), it was assumed that 
people who categorized themselves along the lines of particular groups should 
be interviewed in order to investigate how these categories were constructed 
and what were the relevant categories of ‘others’ mobilized.  
Interview data is suitable for the examination of the way participants construct 
and negotiate hypergoods and middle-range life goods. The focus was how 
people orient to issues of civic identity and action and what is the basis of 
participation as a citizen (collective/individual). The data analysis had three 
main focal points. The first was to identify the different contrary themes or 
ideological dilemmas participants face when they talk about civic action and 
identity in Greece-in-crisis. The analysis tried to identify the dominant lines of 
argument formulated by participants which indicate which explanatory 
resources participants primarily drew on and which constructions were treated 
by participants as more important or more relevant than others in the context 
of discussion. Second, emphasis was laid on category construction on behalf of 
the participants. Researchers argue that categories are places of contestation 
where different category definitions underlie different projects which try to 
mobilize audiences towards different actions (see for example Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001). As a result, different category constructions may underlie 
different projects. 
The aim of the study was to identify (a) the ways in which participants make 
sense of the contemporary situation in Greece, (b) the regularities (and 
irregularities) in the explanatory resources participants mobilize to make sense 
of the contemporary situation in Greece (and their ideological history), (c) the 
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‘rationalization processes’ and dilemmas in the lines of argument identified 
drawing on these resources.  
The original plan was that we would carry out twenty (20) open-ended semi-
structured interviews with members of the abovementioned groups in their 
everyday settings in order to attend to their social milieu. This involved holding 
the interviews in places familiar to participants, where they felt comfortable. 
We accessed participants through identifying entry points, hubs, key contact 
persons and gatekeepers. Participants were recruited using purposeful 
sampling, focusing on members of the afore-mentioned groups who act and 
are internally recognized as representatives of the trade unions or who identify 
with particular social movements. The focus of the interview schedule was on 
the ways in which participants orient to civic identity and culture in the context 
of the current situation in Greece. Namely, the topics covered were the socio-
economic and cultural situation in Greece, participants’ involvement, role and 
action in it, the ways in which it is evolving, movements, actions, initiatives and 
interventions. Overall, 12 interviews and 1 group interview were conducted 
with representatives of the following major syndicates of the public sector: 
ΓΣΕΕ (N=1), ΟΛΜΕ (N=2), ΠΟΣΔΕΠ (N=2), ΠΟΣ (N=1) and of the following social 
movements (N=6+1): ‘I Do Not Pay’ («Δεν Πληρώνω»), ‘The Indignated’ 
(«Αγανακτισμένοι»), ‘Potato Movement’ («Κίνημα Πατάτας»). Interviews 
ranged between 14 minutes and 1 hour 18 minutes (mean=43 minutes, sd=20 
minutes) and were held in participants’ places of work or socialization. 
Interviews were transcribed  and the transcriptions were firstly extensively 
read till some basic categories/topics were easily discernible. Initially, 
therefore, we focused on identifying thematic regularities.  
At a second stage we concentrated on the lines of arguments used by our 
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participants, what explanatory resources these drew on and mobilized, what 
versions of social life and reality they constructed. Within our portfolio of data, 
therefore, we attempted to identify regularities in terms of the lines of 
argument (Wetherell, 1998) mobilized, as well as, in terms of the common 
places (Billig, 1987) around which these lines of argument were developed. 
Attention was also paid to the rhetorical organization of talk based on the 
premises set out in discursive psychology (DP) (Edwards and Potter, 1992).  
The rationale for opting for such an approach overall was that, that while 
surveys and large-scale studies serve to identify the general stances and 
provide an empirical basis for the potential planning of policies, they provide 
limited information concerning the broader argumentative resources within 
which particular representations are constructed and/or about their functions 
in specific micro-social contexts. The two stages of the analysis follow below. 
The presentation of the data follows on the principles of discursive psychology 
(see the British Journal of Social Psychology and Discourse & Society).  
ANALYSIS: RESOURCE AND ARGUMENTATION REGULARITIES  
Regularities were identified mainly in three topics which emerged as dominant 
in talking about the crisis in Greece:  
 Orientation to change 
 Treatment of ‘abroad’ 
 Relationship between state and people 
ORIENTATION TO CHANGE 
There were many accounts of change which were usually associated to 
accounts of the Greek crisis, how it was constructed and where/to whom it was 
attributed.  
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One common line of argument used by participants (mainly macro-social actors 
and few participants in social movements) was that a ‘civic call’ was required. 
According to this line of argument the crisis implicated civic values and by 
incremental, ‘educational’ steps, people will be converted into citizens. The 
‘content’ of these steps varied from as vaguely formulated as ‘doing one’s 
best’, to engaging with politics, and to specific micro-actions.  
Extract 1 - Interview with representative of trade union in higher education 
 
Another line of argument treated change as a more centralised process, 
gradually achieved as a result of the development of a critical mass. According 
to this argument there is a mismatch between practice and the politics which 
are in place to regulate it and it is a critical mass accumulating that drives 
change at a micro level and pushes changes at a macro level. 
Extract 2 - Interview with representative of trade union in higher education 
 
Trade unionists and most social movement participants treated change as 
relevant and applicable to the state, the government, the political system and 
model of production. Namely, participants mobilized the association of civic 
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action to outcome and argued that while civic action comes from people, 
change comes from central government.  
Extract 3 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary 
education  
 
A few participants argued that solidarity is the positive development of civic 
action. 
Extract 4 - Interview with participant in square movement 
 
TREATMENT OF ‘ABROAD’ 
References to ‘abroad’ (εξωτερικό), Europe, the US, and individual states were 
made in different contexts. The main two contexts where ‘abroad’ was 
mobilized was in relation to agency for and origin of contemporary situation in 
Greece and in discussing ways out of it.  
In relation to agency for and origin of the contemporary situation in Greece, 
some participants engaged in differentiating Greece to ‘abroad’ in cultural 
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terms. These were at points treated as ‘choices’ (rationalizing and embedding 
culture with agency); or as ‘pragmatic’ differences (rationalization on the basis 
of external events, conditions or circumstances).  
This differentiation was made by participants who attributed a role or blame to 
‘abroad’ for the developments in Greece and was used as they grounds for 
which it was ‘imposed’, ‘forced’ and ‘alien’. Attributions of agency to the state, 
the political system or government in Greece varied in these lines of argument 
but commonly treated them as ‘weak’. 
Extract 5 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary 
education  
 
In terms of in discussing ways out of the current situation in Greece, the first 
argument used was formulated along the lines of an ‘inward-looking’ approach, 
particularising the Greek case as local or particular in the sense of presenting 
differences with other cases in other countries and arguing that (only) local and 
particular or tailor-made solutions are relevant.  
Extract 6 - Interview with participant in social movement 
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The second line of argument, which made an ‘outward-looking’ approach 
relevant, was one of measuring Greece up on the basis of ‘external’ standards, 
treated as norms or as more advanced.  
Extract 7 - Interview with representative of trade union of Greek employees 
 
Participants treated this measuring up as yardstick to be reached top-down, 
and/or as a fact already reached bottom-up. Resource-wise, this mobilizes and 
engages with a common place in intellectual and lay accounts according to 
which modern Greeks constantly try to measure up with, though never fully 
achieve, a Eurocentric, metaphysical, normative and centripetal type of 
genealogised identity (Liakos, 2007).  
It has been argued that the outward-looking view is a product of post-
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Enlightenment colonialism. However, others argue that this is an 
oversimplification (Liakos, 2001; Herzfeld, 1987) as Greek nation builders did 
not passively accept European colonialist discourse but engaged in ‘practical 
occidentalism’. ‘Practical occidentalism’ refers to evoking Western prototypes 
of Greek national character, to disavowing or criticising aspects of culture as 
‘oriental’ or to seeking to be seen as ‘occidental’ (see also Herzfeld, 1995) 
amidst evaluative accounts of the Orient and the Occident indicating a “painful 
awareness of the inequality of cultural models”. This semantic ‘ambivalence’ is 
seen as reproduced by Greek lay and non-lay actors, expressing a “pervasive 
unease about the status and identity of modern Greek culture”. The long-
lasting official Helleno-Christian discourse, succeeded by a resilient official 
discourse of ‘hegemonic syncretism’, of combining - without omission - both 
Hellenic and populist aspects which was taken up by subsequent political forces 
right up to today, may be argued to have enabled the re-production of these 
resources, constituting them as dominant and prioritised over others (see also 
Herzfeld, 2001). 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND PEOPLE 
There were two main lines of argument here: according to some participants 
(macro-social actors) the state and people are one and the same thing, while 
other participants (in trade unions and social movements) drew a clear 
distinction between the two.  
The state and people are one and the same thing: according to this line of 
argument the people are the state, and the ‘public’, the ‘commons’ are on 
these grounds citizens’ property and responsibility. On these grounds, the crisis 
in Greece is constructed as a value one and realisation of this is treated as a 
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prerequisite for moving forward. 
Extract 8 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary 
education  
 
Distinction between the state and people: this line of argument treats people 
and the state as two entities (sometimes connected through clientelism; 
sometimes disconnected as the state representing a distinct level of ultimate 
management, administration and protection or aggression derives from).  
Extract 9 - Interview with representative of trade union 
 
Participants who alluded to this distinction constructed the crisis in Greece is as 
(primarily) political and economic and change from above was treated as a 
prerequisite for moving forward. Some have traced the symbolic aspects of this 
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in the Mediterranean context where the state from the 19th century onwards is 
associated with corruption, patronage and belated modernity. In this context, 
the state has been found to be counter-positioned to the individual or group, 
to be discursively used to represent inflexibility and estrangement from the 
people and, thus, ineffectiveness to respond reasonably in practice. In lay talk, 
this seems to enable self- criticism, but also ultimately a tendency to oppose 
the bureaucratic state to the people, and to direct blame attribution to (an) 
impersonal, external agency. This line of argument, therefore, seems to draw 
on an explanatory resource according to which the state is seen as the 
imposed, ‘foreign’ power, referring to a system of administration imported in 
the making of the modern Greek state, and history is read as a plot of foreign 
powers against Greece, which is in turn considered a nation symbolically 
disabled and condemned to servitude. 
RATIONALIZATION PROCESSES AND HYPERGOODS 
The aforementioned rationalization processes could be seen as contextualizing 
cultural patterns of hypergoods. Description of the situation in Greece, of 
personal recounting of events, and description of emotional states in moments 
of heightened tension provide the background to bring forward the moral 
principles of the actors. Interesting enough, similar, pragmatic, descriptions of 
the political and economic evils of Greece (basically political corruption and 
economic weakness) were linked to three quite distinct lines of argumentation: 
A passive, an active, and a mixed one. In its passive form, ‘facts’ and personal 
experience were used to justify a preconceived idea of hypergoods, such as 
‘direct democracy’, or ‘people in power’ as well as to condemned preconceived 
ideas of ‘hyper-evils’, such as the ‘political system’. We call it passive as it 
reacts to the evils, but without any clear course of developing long-lasting 
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social structures. The Square Movement argumentation falls into this pattern: 
Extract 10 - Interview with a member of the Square Movement  
 
In its active form, facts and personal experience were used as a basis to seek 
out solutions and reach out middle-range life-goods that were not appreciated 
beforehand. The ‘no-mediators’ or ‘potato movement’ represent such cognitive 
process: the worth of the community is found in actions that serve the 
common good in voluntary, non-hierarchical common action, inspired by a 
sense of contribution to the common good. The ‘potato’ or ‘no-mediators’ 
movement constitutes an example on an effort to develop new social 
structures that are both economical and moral. 
Extract 11 - Interview with a member of the potato movement 
 
A third strand, represented by the unionists, falls somewhere in the middle: 
Condemnation of the political system, and acknowledgement of long-term 
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economic weakness neither leads to questioning the whole structure of liberal 
democracy, nor to proposals for new types of unionism. Instead, their 
arguments speak of either returning to the good old comprehensive structures 
of a united front, or a return to forgotten values. In all, this strand indicates 
that charismatic action, of changing social structures in radical reshuffling of 
cultural codes, does not emerge easily out of established channels of 
institutional organizations; change comes from outside, from free-floating 
actors that amass resources and appropriate them in their own social 
structures.    
Extract 12 - Interview with a first unionist 
 
Extract 13 - Interview with a second unionist 
 
More important, the arbitrary way by which social actors link facts with binary 
oppositions of hypergoods and ‘hyperevils’, and of middle-range life goods and 
life evils, strongly suggest that values alone are not enough to depict the moral 
universe of a social actor; most people adhere to the same hypergoods and to 
similar life goods. Instead, we need to know the binary opposition to each one 
of them. We need to know the full binary code, that is, the juxtaposition; not 
  32 
only the bright side, but its shadow as well. Only then we can understand 
divisive lines of otherwise democrats who adhere to democratic principles but 
disagree on what constitutes the dark side of democracy. 
5. Conclusions 
The starting point of the analysis of civil religion in Greece was the Ramfos 
thesis that Greek civility is significantly affected by the ‘entrenched self’ that is 
cultivated by the still pre-modern and non-reflective Orthodox religion. The 
findings produced much more than a simple verification or rejection of this 
thesis. Indeed, the analytical scheme on which our research was based upon 
allowed us to read, and by the primary research to reveal, albeit only 
tentatively, a moral universe that permeates and deeply affects the workings of 
the Greek civil society: Civil consciousness in Greece strongly correlates with 
the Orthodox theology and related religious practices to produce a very specific 
type of civil attitude that transcends modern ideologies and links them to the 
cultural, indeed, to the civilizational past of the country, centered around an 
emotive and personalized sense of justice and righteousness ‘above the law’, 
overwhelmingly collectivist and, ‘defiant’ of bureaucratic rationalization 
processes.  
Furthermore, the study showed that this religious mode of perceiving modern 
hypergoods may take more specific, and to no small degree, antithetical forms 
crystallized in various middle-range life-goods which, nevertheless, are not 
clearly demarcated, but instead communicate with one another according to 
the position of social actors in the social division of labor and personal 
orientations and priorities. While more detailed investigation of the subject-
matter is necessary, the importance of the social division of labor in shaping an 
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individual discourse appears to be critical: As all of the five discourses the 
statistical analysis revealed are sub-routines of the same democratic code, 
particular binary sets of the latter could easily shift positions and priority 
according to the social status of the actor.  
In a nutshell, out of the same cultural premises more than one political 
discourse emerges. These discourses, in the form of ethical behavior, are 
formed inside the social division of labor establishing hegemonic 
wirtschaftethiks. It is intriguing, urging us to develop more precise 
methodological tools and detailed analysis, that while pragmatic reflections 
(e.g., ‘mistakes of the past’, ‘weak economic basis’, ‘political corruption’) are 
found in all interviews, this pragmatism is not identifiable in the quantitative 
analysis suggesting that it does not constitute a ‘value system’. Moreover, 
instead of being linked to a methodical rationalist value postulates, pragmatism 
is linked primarily to voluntarist hypergoods. All these need to be investigated 
in a future research project that takes into account the present findings, a 
comparative, cross-cultural, study if possible. For the moment, we could claim 
that this probing study has brought forward enough evidence that morality 
constitutes a key feature of social structure and social action, and as such it 
belongs to the core of the sociological analysis of civil society. 
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